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CAN WE TRUST OUR ARMY
TO SPOILSMEN ?

A PAPER READ

AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF

THE NATIONAL CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM LEAGUE

AT BALTIMORE, MD.

DECEMBER 16, 1898.

BY

CHARLES J. BONAPARTE.

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THE hardworking, clear-headed old man, homely and caustic of speech, perhaps mildly cynical, but withal kind and generous, who typifies in fable and caricature the American *aemos*, has, in truth, little liking for the job of a conquering hero; the tall, white hat he wears, may be neither elegant nor picturesque, but it constitutes a far more comfortable and healthful and a prodigiously less expensive form of headgear than a laurel crown, and he already shrewdly guesses, I fear he may soon know from experience, that there is more than a fair chance of finding among the spoils of victory a choice albino of the genus *elefas*. But Uncle Sam has also a terrible propensity for seeing things as they are; for this, as a source both of strength and of weakness, have men of English speech been noted in all ages, in this have they differed most from Spaniards and Frenchmen and Germans, namely, that they live, not in memories or hopes, in ideas or theories, but in facts. It was emphatically a Yankee poet who said:

“ Trust no future, howe’er pleasant ; ”
“ Let the dead past bury its dead ; ”
“ Act, act in the living present, ”
“ Heart within and God o’er head. ”

Now our good Uncle Sam sees in the world of the living present a world wherein

“ Strife comes with manhood as waking with day ; ”
wherein the happiness, nay the continued life, of every man is the prize of an endless conflict, and wherein the weak go pitilessly to the wall; wherein, among communities of men, the strong one armed holds what it hath secure, and the one not strong or not armed (for in modern times the terms tend daily to be more nearly equivalent in meaning) holds what it hath on sufferance until coveted by a stronger. He sees in the

world of Peace Societies and Arbitration Leagues the world of a future, a future doubtless pleasant, but no more to be trusted than is any of its kind. He sees this just as an Englishman could see that Richard Plantagenet, Charles Stewart or George of Hanover, by whatever name called, was yet only a man, with no less than his share of human frailty and human passion, while to a Frenchman of the *ancien régime* it was well nigh an article of faith to find in one annointed at Rheims a Saint Louis, even when named Louis XV. He sees further that in this world of the present, this world which, after all, God o'er-head has made, not in a world of the future seen by kindly men in day-dreams, he must live and do his appointed work ; and, so seeing, if perchance some part of that work is to be done in arms, he will do it, not, indeed, with a light heart, but yet well, so well that there will be no need to do it over again.

And he certainly does not believe a saying, now often quoted to various ends and in various senses, but true in none ; the American people will not be readily convinced that " War is Hell." I have said that, as a people, we do not live in memories, but some memories do enter into our national life ; it will be a changed nation which shall recognize in Washington a mortal Beelzebub, and in the men who left their homes to fight at Bunker Hill, suffer at Valley Forge, conquer at Saratoga or Yorktown, demons in training. In a great school of self-sacrifice and obedience there is little to recall the eternal prison house of rebellious spirits, crushed for their disorderly ambition.

I have said so much to show my own standpoint and to whom I would now speak ; I address, not those who think the counsels of Washington " out of date " or " behind the times," based upon principles of national policy which the greater statesmen of our day have " outgrown ;" nor yet those who think Washington's example one to be shunned and Washington's profession one unworthy of a civilized or a Christian man, but those of my fellow-countrymen (numbering in my opinion certainly nine out of every ten of them) who have no longing for wars or conquests and view with distrust and misgiving our adoption of a meddlesome, visionary foreign policy which leads to these, but who know that, while men remain neither better nor worse than men, there will be times

when the sword must be drawn, and know, moreover, that often it can remain in the scabbard because, and only because, it is, and is known to be, sharp and ready to the hand which shall wield it. And, speaking to these, I propose to ask and answer two questions of profound interest to them as to me—Can the country's safety and honor be trusted in the care of our present public men? And, if these be unworthy of such trust, whence springs their unworthiness?

When Congress in April last demanded the immediate abandonment by the Spanish Crown of a territory which for four hundred years had formed part of its dominions, this action was, in at least one respect, absolutely without precedent in history; never before, so far as I know, had any government, intentionally and with knowledge, adopted a course which made war inevitable and the moment of its outbreak a question of hours, with nothing which could be called by the widest stretch of imagination or courtesy an army to sustain the issue thus raised. Yet this was then literally true of the United States; our regular army consisted of less than 27,000 troops, scattered over a territory as large as all Europe, and even these, as the event soon made painfully apparent, were wholly unprepared to take the field. As a so-called reserve, we had about 105,000 organized militia, on the whole a useful and meritorious force for its legitimate purposes (although its utility and merit varied greatly in different localities), but neither intended nor fit for active, and especially for foreign, service. Indeed, to call it a "reserve" at all, in any military sense, is hardly more appropriate than would be the same term applied to the police of our cities or the *posses* at the command of our sheriffs. As a body, it was not subject to the authority of the President or even of Congress, and, in fact, no company had a legal organization a foot beyond the borders of its own State. Moreover, it constituted at best, if not the literally raw, the less than half baked material of an army. The progress of civilization has not yet enabled us to dispense with mothers, so students of biology should be ready to admit that there may be in males of the species *homo sapiens* a latent hereditary passion for millinery and mantua making, for which, in civil life, they can usually find only the imperfect gratification derived from footing bills; nor is it surprising that this should render the young male of the same animal prone to

perambulate in bright colored clothes and brass buttons, "toting" (as our Aunties would say) guns and swords and other shiny things "to dazzle and dismay." All this is doubtless magnificent, especially to the heroes' partners at the German, but it is not war; and if it be a school for war, it is hardly more than a kindergarten.

From what I have just said, it must not be supposed for a moment that I am inclined either to undervalue our National Guard or to sneer at those of its members who formed the nucleus of our improvised army last Spring. With the First Congress, I recognize "a well regulated militia" as "necessary to the security of a free State;" in the readiness wherewith so many thousands of our young men left their homes for a war, which, as I have reason to think, a large majority deemed unnecessary and unwise, in their cheerfulness and obedience under privations, all the harder to bear because plainly needless, and in the steadiness and gallantry displayed by substantially all of them who went into action, I see, perhaps, the most encouraging and healthful symptoms of our national life. It is, however, no less true that when Congress rushed into a war of aggression, this country, containing seventy millions of people, had not twenty thousand available soldiers.

A foreigner ignorant of the facts might conjecture from this astounding improvidence and levity that Congress did not expect the outbreak of hostilities or was ignorant of the country's plight or, perhaps, hesitated to sooner relieve this because unwilling to sustain the President in a warlike policy condemned by public opinion; in fact, Congress had been straining in the leash for months to make war inevitable despite the reluctance of both the President and the people, and one of the early measures introduced at its recent session was a bill to increase the regular army in time of war to a little over one hundred thousand men. For the consideration of this bill no time could be found during many weeks, while our Solons were relieving their pent-up bosoms of long diatribes against the Civil Service Law; at last it received attention only to be summarily rejected because some officers of the National Guard had (or were alleged to have) exhibited the almost incredible ignorance, presumption and vanity to claim that they could do all the fighting there might be to do. Another bill to authorize the trifling addition of some one thousand six

hundred men to the artillery, although finally passed, was debated and opposed as though peace had been assured for a century.

A more plausible explanation, which will perhaps be one day added to the number of those lies made truth by History, is that Congress relied with confidence and reason on overwhelming naval superiority to give time for adequate military preparations after war had been declared. It is, in the first place, extremely doubtful whether more Senators or more Representatives than can be counted on one's ten fingers had formed, or were capable of forming, any intelligent opinion as to the relative strength of Spain's navy and of ours, or had ever given five minutes' thought to the subject. It is to be noted, secondly, that in fact no such disparity of force existed, or, at all events, was supposed by competent judges to exist, when the war commenced. On the Continent most European experts thought the navies were not unfairly matched; some thought the odds, on the whole, a little against us. An experienced and highly meritorious American officer, whose views I obtained, whilst predicting our victory, said the Spaniards had three really effective fighting ships to our one. Finally our politicians did not hesitate a few years since to offer grave provocations to Great Britain respecting a matter of no more moment than the Venezuelan boundary, with no thought of her immense naval strength, with no semblance of preparation for defence and with no controversy among themselves except as to which party was entitled to the greater credit for thus exposing the country to imminent risk of humiliating disaster.

It may be worth a moment's pause to fully realize the national danger involved in this incident, and which we escaped through no wisdom of our rulers, but solely through the wise forbearance of the government and people we so lightly challenged. Much is now said as to whether we should or should not persist in our "isolation" by those who forget that, in a military sense, this isolation is already, in great measure, a thing of the past. With our shores but six days' space from the harbors of the Old World, the transportation hither of 50,000 troops would be a less task for the navy and mercantile marine of England than was that of General Ross' brigade in 1814. Our present Secretary of War is said to have replied when asked, a year or more since, what we

should do if at war with one of the great powers: "In thirty days the United States could place in the field millions of men and back them up with a wall of fire in the shape of veterans." Last summer, with this modest and judicious patriot in the War Department, not thirty, but sixty days after the war commenced, more time, be it remembered, than separated the declaration from Sedan, far more time than separated the declaration from Sadowa, we placed in the field, not "millions," but barely sixteen thousand men, and so neglected these that a well-informed, if somewhat unfriendly, foreign critic could say and say truthfully:

"Here, at the end of the nineteenth century, one of the richest nations on earth, one of the most intelligent and one which poses as being amongst the most civilized, sends out a small army to fight, but shows herself unable either to feed the soldiers that fight for her, tend the wounded that bleed for her, or bury the dead that die for her."

In the light of this experience, I do not know, nor am I much interested to know, what General Alger may think on the subject, but I ask any one of my present hearers, I ask any intelligent and fairly educated American, had we become involved in war, as we became involved in controversy, with a power having, not merely 50,000 troops ready to embark at a week's notice, but unquestioned command of the sea and almost unlimited resources in shipping, could any city of our seaboard have reasonably expected a better fate than befell Washington, could any have reasonably hoped to make so stout a defence as did Baltimore eighty-four years ago? As for the General's "wall of fire," it is formidable enough, no doubt, to the Pension Office; its "bricks" or "sparks" (whichever may be the proper metaphor) have levied huge contributions from our Treasury, but, like the Claudii, their

"... yoke has never lain on any neck but ours,"

and it is quite safe to assume that it never will.

The true explanation of this apparently inexplicable behavior of Congress is disgracefully simple; its members (with some honorable exceptions, which but prove the rule) are indifferent to the prosperity, the dignity, the security of the country they govern. Like Mr. Flannigan, of Texas, they might ask in astonishment, "What are we here for?" were it sug-

gested that they give time or thought to questions of diplomacy or national defence, or anything except office-mongering and electioneering. Their hearts and lives are given to the task of quartering on the taxpayers for support as many as may be of their relatives and dependents and hangers-on of high and low degree, preferably such as are too lazy, stupid or vicious to support themselves; for anything else, unless it be the retention of their own places, they have but the leavings of their time and the dregs of their energy. This was curiously illustrated by their action respecting the additions to the clerical force of the War and Treasury Departments made necessary by the war. This increase was, of course, indispensable if the vastly augmented work of these departments was to be properly performed, but their efficiency did not really interest Congress; what the members had at heart was the following clause in the Urgent Deficiency Bill, adopted as an amendment by the House of Representatives on June 20th last:

“The temporary force authorized by this section of this act and the clerical force and other employees appropriated for in the act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes, approved June 13, 1898, and the act making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the payment of pensions and for other objects for the fiscal year 1898, and for other purposes, approved May 31, 1898, shall be appointed for a term not exceeding one year, as authorized, respectively, without compliance with the conditions prescribed by the act entitled “An act to regulate and improve the civil service,” approved January 16, 1883.

In moving this amendment, Mr. Cannon, of Illinois, made the following statements:

“ Your committee on investigation found that it was not practicable to call into motion the machinery of the Civil Service Commission for the purpose of making these appointments. It was necessary to have the force and to have it at once. Further than that, we were told, Mr. Chairman, that the machinery of the Civil Service Commission could not be invoked without damage to the Commission itself and damage to the so-called Civil Service Reform, because it is not adapted to the employment of emergency or temporary people. And when you undertake to make it grind out

something that it is not adapted to and not intended for, and which does not come within the alleged evils for which the law was originally passed, you do not improve the character of the employees you acquire under it, and you only work injury to the reform itself. Therefore, from every standpoint, we found it much better, after the very fullest investigation we could give to the matter, to report this provision in the pending bill."

Every allegation of fact thus made was a falsehood. The Committee had not made "the very fullest investigation" on the subject; apparently it had made no investigation at all; certainly it had addressed no inquiry to the Civil Service Commission itself. It was perfectly "practicable to call into motion the machinery of the Civil Service Commission for the purpose of making these appointments;" indeed, they could have been thus made, not only far more satisfactorily, but also more rapidly than in any other way or than they were in fact. There were at the time thousands of eligibles on the registers of the Commission, and any desired number could have been certified for appointment within a few hours. It was absolutely false that "the machinery of the Civil Service Commission . . . is not adapted to the employment of emergency or temporary people"; it has been used repeatedly for this purpose, and always with entirely satisfactory results; as instances, for several years the Railway Mail Service voluntarily selected its temporary weighers from the list of eligibles, and the temporary force of extra compositors employed in the Government printing office during the sessions of Congress are so chosen, more than a hundred being often appointed in a single day. Moreover, Mr. Cannon either knew what he said to be false or had made no attempt seriously and in good faith to learn the facts, whilst claiming to speak "after the very fullest investigation."

However, our statesmen got the places for their henchmen, and a precious lot of incapables they foisted on the Government! Some five hundred and sixty were appointed in the War Department alone. It is claimed on behalf of the Secretary of War that for the acknowledged incompetency of many among these five hundred and sixty he was not to blame; "he was obliged to rely upon the representations made to him by those who sought appointments. It was

impossible for him to make adequate inquiry into their qualifications." Nevertheless, he could have filled their positions with men whose "qualifications" had been ascertained by "adequate inquiry"; the Civil Service Commission stood ready to furnish the names of thousands of men thus tested, and a resort to their registers, whilst not *required*, was yet not *forbidden* by the law, although it would have disappointed the selfish greed of those who framed this law.

His excuse bears a close resemblance to that offered by the Surgeon-General for that deficiency in the care of the army which has most keenly touched the people. The same foreigner whom I have already quoted says further :

"All through the fighting of the army in Cuba there was a scandalous want of medical attendance. For this there **was** absolutely no excuse. Hundreds of medical men throughout the States had volunteered their services for the war."

Indeed, in his memorandum to the Investigating Commission, General Sternberg says :

"The number of applications has been so great and the personal visits of applicants and their friends so numerous as to constitute a serious embarrassment in conducting the business of my office."

Yet, although he had to give up so much of his time to "personal visits of applicants and their friends" (were there, perchance, a few Senators and Representatives and other influential politicians among these "friends"?), he admits that :

". . . . It has been impossible to make a careful selection, owing to the great pressure of business in the Surgeon-General's office, and the *urgency* has been so great that it has not been practicable to have examining boards to pass upon their qualifications."

Doubtless the "urgency" *was* great; the urgency, that is to say, of those men whose one thought in the nation's extremity was to find berths at its cost for themselves or others in their interest; and "urgent" people of this kind with a "pull" would object strongly to "examining boards to pass upon" the "qualifications" of their *protéges*. Doubtless they would deem such boards "un-American" and "Chinese." Examinations of any kind are very distasteful to our statesmen. But the fruits of such "urgency" on their part, and of such

yielding to it on his part, were grim enough. In the words of my critic:

"There are times when blundering incompetence attains the dignity of crime. Those who were responsible for the management of the Army Medical Department have the blood of many of their fellow-countrymen to answer for. Sick men were hurried to their death by stupid mismanagement and the want of ordinary hospital care, while numbers of wounded men were practically murdered by neglect. No one who has not actually witnessed the scenes of this war can realize its tragedy."

As an instance of this "tragedy" he adds:

"Three days after the fight at San Juan the body of a man was found sitting up under a tree; his head had fallen on his right shoulder; his water bottle was at his side empty; in his right hand he held a photograph of a woman—evidently his wife, and in his left a photograph of a group of four children. He was shot through both knees, but had evidently been able to drag himself under the shade of the tree, and there waited for someone to stanch his wounds and attend to him; but, as was the case with so many others, nobody came."

General Sternberg says of cases such as this:

"It has not been the expectation of the medical department that every wounded man would receive immediately the attention of a surgeon."

Perhaps, then, three days is not an unreasonable time for him to wait, and, of course, it would be altogether captious to complain of the case reported by Captain Lee in *Scribner's* for October of a man shot through the stomach at eight in the morning, and left lying in a great pool of his own blood, with no care but that afforded by a badly wounded comrade, until one in the afternoon, and how much longer the narrator could not say—in all human probability until his death. It is noted by the writer whom I have so often quoted already:

"In General Shafter's official account there were eighty-one reported missing after the fighting in a few days about San Juan. General Shafter significantly remarks that most of those may be taken as having been killed."

He adds:

"I quite agree with him. They were killed—many of them were murdered by neglect."

I have said of this writer that his bias is decidedly unfriendly towards Americans; nevertheless, I think few fair-minded people will question the justice of his general conclusion thus expressed:

"Looking back at all the operations around Santiago, the Americans may feel proud of the bravery of their Regulars and some of the Volunteers, notably the Rough Riders. . . . The way in which men of all ranks, both Regulars and Volunteers, bore severe privations without murmuring is beyond all praise; but, having said that, I think there is nothing else connected with the American Army of which the people of the United States should not feel thoroughly ashamed."

He adds:

"When speaking about it to intelligent Americans I am always met with the same reply, 'that politics were at the bottom of it.'"

He had previously remarked the frequency with which he had heard it said of volunteer officers:

"So-and-so got that place because he was very useful during the late campaign."

Adding:

"For a few days I was rather under the impression that the campaign referred to was the last Civil War, but then discovered that it was the late election campaign that was meant. Men were placed in responsible positions, not so much upon their qualifications as on account of the services they had rendered to their party. The disastrous results of this system have been evident throughout the war. The political bosses had the appointment of men to the highest positions of the army and the army departments."

And what he and others saw at Santiago was the experience of competent observers elsewhere. Thus, in a very interesting unpublished narrative of personal experience at Chickamauga, prepared by an unusually well-informed and intelligent volunteer, which I had the opportunity to examine, the writer asks;

" . . . why a whole army corps should have been placed under the medical care of a man whose only recent professional affiliations were those of a veterinary? Were no competent surgeons to be found whose interest in humanity was undivided? Or was this, after all, a case of pull?"

Leaving this question to be answered by the Investigating Commission, he goes on to give many instances of obvious unfairness and favoritism. Thus he says:

"I have seen in one hospital a fourth year student in medicine kept twelve hours a day for several weeks merely emptying and cleaning bed pans, while men who knew absolutely nothing of medicine or drugs were nursing. Under such a *régime* as this, the worst kind of neglect could arise, and often did. It was common talk at one hospital how one poor fellow lay in his cot with parts of his body already covered with maggots before the merciful hand of the Angel of Death ended his suffering on his bed of filth. Another case of injustice was in placing the son of one of America's greatest surgeons, who had been his father's assistant, in charge of the ice-chest at a division hospital, where he handled milk and ice, while working in the typhoid wards were men who could not read a prescription, take a temperature or give a bath. Is it any wonder that under such conditions as these typhoid fever spread and increased? With this lack of sanitary precautions, and with men often totally devoid of medical attainments put over the sick, it is fortunate that things were not much worse even than they were."

His conclusions deserve our careful consideration:

"Much of our lack of preparation, in the medical department as well as in every other department, grew out of the long-cherished idea that our situation insured national safety. And we never seriously contemplated a campaign beyond our shore line until this emergency arose. This, however, does not wholly explain the disastrous results growing out of disease. It is notorious that appointments were made without proper consideration of the candidate or of the work he was expected to do. It is beyond doubt that some of the appointments were made solely because of the influence those appointed were able to bring to bear through political channels. The feeding and clothing of this army, which represented the very flower of our population, and the care of our sick was sometimes entrusted to men who were absolutely untried and who had never shown that they possessed the requisite executive ability or special training. Even when the deadly emergency was upon us, the best available material was often allowed to remain unutilized, because less competent persons stood in the

way. Such a condition of affairs is an instance of the danger of the spoils system, and it is also an arraignment of it."

Its "arraignment" is, however, yet more formidable when we consider the treatment of our army at the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, given the latter by the Constitution. The first duty to the army which Mr. McKinley was called upon to discharge was the choice of a fit man as Secretary of War; but how did he discharge that duty? In other words, what manner of man did he choose? And why did he choose him?

In the first place, he chose a man with a military record; this, be it remembered, he was under no obligation either of law, custom or public policy to do. The office is a civil, not a military one, and although in most European countries it is habitually filled by a soldier, the wisdom of this arrangement is by no means indisputable; the great "organizers of victory" have been civilians. But if the President saw fit to select as the administrative head of the army a man with a military record, he was under a manifest obligation to choose one with at least a clear record, that is to say, with such a record as his own; it was equally indecorous and impolitic to place in authority over soldiers a man whom most soldiers regarded with suspicion and contempt, and such a choice was the more unpardonable on the part of one who had been a soldier, and a good soldier, himself. Now, General Alger, as a soldier, comes before the public somewhat as Hood's Count came to marry Miss Kilmansegg, "not under a cloud, but in a fog;" he may have been treated with injustice, perhaps he was the victim of circumstances or else of prejudice or personal dislike, but I merely state notorious facts when I say that his service in the Civil War had been marked by unfortunate incidents, subjecting him to serious imputations, which may possibly have been unfounded, but none the less affected his standing with military men; and that he was further suspected, again perhaps unjustly, but on grounds, at least, plausible, of an attempt to misrepresent or conceal these incidents when an aspirant for the Presidency; and, finally, that, although he had some friends in the army, he did not enjoy its general respect and confidence. In studiously picking out a man of these antecedents for the place he thus filled Mr. McKinley showed, I will not say a defiance, but, at least, a disregard of professional opinion,

differing widely in degree, but not in kind, from that exhibited by Charles X when he made the deserter of Waterloo his Minister of War.

The Secretary was, moreover, certainly past his prime and of uncertain health, and was not known to possess, or, at least, had never exhibited, any conspicuous administrative ability, or any conspicuous ability of any kind. His selection might well seem as incomprehensible to a foreigner as the failure of Congress to make any preparation for a war which it did everything to provoke, but the explanation is neither more obscure nor more creditable. General Alger will probably have the Michigan delegation to "deliver" in the Republican Convention of 1900, and he can do much to make the "Grand Army vote" serviceable both at primaries and at the polls; these reasons are no less sufficient to explain his retention; their weight is in no wise diminished by anything he has done or allowed to be done.

Of his official record I say little, not because there is little to say, but because there is little need to say anything. Two incidents, however, are sufficiently characteristic to deserve a word of notice. He received a confidential official letter from Col. Roosevelt, written with the approval of the latter's immediate superior, on a matter of grave public interest; this confidential official letter he published, together with a silly and disingenuous reply on his own part, because he foolishly imagined that its publication would injure the political prospects of its writer; would "lay-out Teddy," to use the words attributed to one of his confidants. This petty exhibition of senile spite did not "lay-out Teddy," doubtless to the great surprise of the mighty mind which devised it, but it served to lay out very thoroughly, if any such process were needed, the few fragments of its author's reputation as a man of honor. Together with the Adjutant-General of the Army he has been virtually accused by its ranking General of causing or permitting official communications to be garbled or suppressed in a published correspondence for the paltry and ridiculous purpose of misleading the public as to that officer's relation to the Santiago campaign; apparently because he also was supposed by one or both of them to have a political ambition, and to need "laying-out"; not only have the parties thus accused taken no steps to secure an official investigation of this charge, but the

President, seemingly in their interest, has carefully excluded it from the scope of the enquiry which he was at last goaded or shamed into ordering. Mention of the Adjutant-General here calls to mind a curious and significant episode. A special act to authorize his promotion was introduced in Congress, with, it was said, the cordial approval of the President. It may have been no more the fault of this officer that he was kept from the field than that he came from Ohio, but it seemed strange that a soldier who had never left Washington should be singled out for prompt and peculiar honor, especially when, to say the least, the administration of his office had not been either conspicuously successful or conspicuously popular. Here, again, however, the explanation is not difficult: like the Surgeon-General, he had been compelled to give up most of his time and strength, not to his legitimate duties, but to the solicitations of influential politicians for favors of all sorts, and so exhausting were his strenuous efforts to satisfy their "urgency" that later in the summer he was said by the newspapers to be threatened with nervous prostration.

Many thoughtful and patriotic citizens view with anxiety, indeed with alarm, the new and grave responsibilities imposed upon the United States as fruits of the late war. A gentleman for whom I have great respect recently wrote me that he regarded Civil Service Reform as a matter of altogether subordinate importance compared with issues arising from these responsibilities. I could not agree with him; I regard the thorough and practical realization of that reform in all branches of our government as no less indispensable to the nation's safety and honor than to the nation's tranquility and morals. To have our army worthy of its duty and of its past, we must protect it, just as we must protect our judiciary and our schools and everything we prize, from the taint of "spoils" politics: on this condition only can the "respectable establishment" which Washington deemed essential to our national defense be "respectable" in any sense of the term. Some, and among them some to whom we rightly look for guidance, fear lest, as with other republics both of the past and of the present, we may sacrifice our liberty and prosperity to dreams of foreign conquest and military glory, lest the time come "when every American workman shall carry a soldier on his back." For me, that is not our peril; the

honest American of every condition in life, in my eyes, is a Sinbad already, but his burden is a loathsome "spoils" politician, reeking with the contagion of moral vileness. We must free our country from this miserable bondage; if that can be done, her soldiers will be in the future, as, after all has been said, they have always been in the past, those among her children of whom she has least cause to be ashamed.

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
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